NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 41 | Number 1

Article 18

12-1-1962

Insane Persons -- Involuntary Commitment
Procedures -- Due Process
George C. Cochran

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
George C. Cochran, Insane Persons -- Involuntary Commitment Procedures -- Due Process, 41 N.C. L. Rev. 141 (1962).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol41/iss1/18

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

1962]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

prove the ruling in the principal case, its holding would permanently
lay to rest the commissioner's contention, suggested by Schubert,
that one cannot obtain more rights than one's devisor or vendor had.
As pointed out in World Publishing the problem should be analyzed
on the basis of what the taxpayer has rather than what a prior lessor
may have had. From this point of view World Publishing and
Moore are in accord.
BORDEN R. HALLOWES
Insane Persons-Involuntary Commitment Procedures-Due Process
North Carolina's statutory commitment procedure has been put
together in a piecemeal manner' and does not readily conform to any
pattern of laws applicable in other jurisdictions.2 The General
Assembly, recognizing the special problems concerning care of the
mentally ill, has constantly striven to modernize the old law.' In
what has appeared to be cognizance of this endeavor, the court has
taken judicial notice of the fact that commitment of a mentally ill
person involves a procedure unlike any other.4
For example, in the case of In re Harris,5 the court overruled
previous decisions6 and enlarged the writ of habeas corpus to the
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-35.1 to -68.1 (1958), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 122-36 to -68.1 (Supp. 1961).
For graphic comparisons of all state procedures see LiNDMAN & MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 44-106 (1961); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill; Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv.
945, 1008-16 (1959). Nonconformity by North Carolina is not in itself

damning, for there is little conformity between the states as to any type of
commitment procedure. See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra; Ross, supra.
An attempt to gain uniformity was made in 1950 by the preparation of a
"Draft Act" which was sent to all the state governors as a working model to
be adapted to local needs and conditions. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITILIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1951).
Approximately ten states have adopted the Draft Act in whole or in part.
Slovenko & Super, Commitment Proceduresin Louisiana,35 TUL. L. REv. 705
n.2 (1961).
'There have been over forty changes since 1958 dealing with mental
health. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 122 (Supp. 1961). Twenty-two of these
deal directly with commitment procedures. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-36 to

-91 (Supp. 1961).
'Involuntary commitment proceedings are, strictly speaking, neither a
civil action nor a special proceeding. In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d
142 (1940). This "creates a problem only in the minds of those who are not

familiar with the distinction between a hospitalization proceeding and a
criminal or civil trial." Whitmore, Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 19 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 512, 524-25 (1951).
241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954).

E.g., In re Chase, 193 N.C. 450, 137 S.E. 305 (1927).
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extent that it now provides for a judicial determination as to the
person's sanity at the time that the writ is issued,7 while also serving
its historical purpose of testing the legality of the original detention.
This meang simply that no commitment is "final."' Now the writ
can be used in the form of an appeal, 9 thus acting as a further safeguard to prevent the continuing incarceration of a person of sane
mind.
In the recent case of In re Wilson, 10 the petitioner was indeterminately committed to a mental hospital through the use of North
Carolina's "standard" procedure:"
(1) Filing of an affidavit before the clerk of the superior court
requesting an examination of an alleged mentally ill 2 person ;"3
(2) Issuance of an order by the clerk directing two physicians
14
to personally examine the proposed patient.
(3) Certification by the physicians, service of notice to the proposed patient, and the conducting of a hearing by the clerk;1"
(4) Upon determination by the clerk that the person is in need
of care and treatment, commitment to a mental hospital for an observation period;16
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-33 (2) (1958)
provides for release "Where, though
the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission, or event
which has taken place afterwards, the party has become entitled to be discharged." The court stated that the "recovery from a mental disease after
commitment to an institution would seem to be an 'event which has taken

place afterwards' .

. ."

within the meaning of the statute and held that the

petitioner was entitled to be released. 241 N.C. at 181, 84 S.E.2d at 809.
' This is used in the context that a person committed has no means of
release except by will of the hospital authorities or some other nonjudicial
authority.
'Hiatt v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949).
10257 N.C. 593, 126 S.E.2d 489 (1962).

This procedure is not to be confused with admittance by medical certification as provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-62.1 (Supp. 1961) or emergency
commitment as provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-57 (Supp. 1961).
"[A]n illness which so lessens the capacity of the person to use his
customary self control, judgement, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs,
and social relations as to make it necessary and advisable for him to be under
treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12235.1 3(1958).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-42 (1958).
12

"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-43 (Supp. 1961).

The physicians cannot be

related by blood or marriage to the proposed patient or directly connected
with the hospital of commitment. Ibid.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46 (Supp. 1961).
" Ibid. The period is originally for sixty days. This may be extended
another four months upon request of the hospital authorities and by order of
the clerk. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961). This procedure was
followed in the principal case. 257 N.C. at 594, 126 S.E.2d at 489.
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(5) At the end of the observation period, filing of a report by
tl1e hospital authorities stating their conclusions ;17
(6) Indeterminate commitment ordered by the clerk if the "facts
may warrant.'

8

After mote than two years of treatment a writ of habeas corpus
was filed. The writ challenged the legality of the petitioner's confinement on the grounds that indeterminate commitment, following the
observation period, without benefit of a prior notice and right to a
second hearing, violated her rights under article I, section 17 of the
constitution of North Carolina, and under the due process clause of
the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 9 The
court agreed with this line of reasoning and held that the petitioner
was being deprived of her liberty without benefit of due process of
law." As interpreted it would appear that this adherence to strict
due process requirements has placed a considerable barrier in the
path of future advances in realistic mental health legislation.
There is a split of authority with regard to due process requirements 2' and the mentally ill person's right to notice and hearing.
The majority2 holds that commitment without judical authority,2"
and thus without notice and hearing, does not violate procedural
due process, if there is an immediate right of appeal,24 or provisions
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961).
1 Ibid.
10257 N.C. at 595, 126 S.E.2d at 490-91.
20 Id. at 597, 126 S.E.2d at 492. The court interpreted the power granted
the clerk to indeterminately commit "as the facts may warrant" under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961) to mean that the patient must first be
given notice and a right to a hearing. Thus the court upheld the constitutionality
of the statute but condemned the interpretation.
2' For a complete and intricate
analysis of this subject see Kadish, Meth-

odology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication---A Survey and Criterion,

66

YALE

L.J. 319 (1957).

"2Kadish,

A Case Study in the Significance of ProceduralDue Process-

Institutionalizingthe Mentally Ill, 9

WESTERN POLITICAL

Q. 93, 111 (1956) ;

Hearings Before the Subconimittee on, Constitutional Rights on the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-3 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as 1961 Hearings].
" A procedure is not judicial unless the court has discretion to determine
whether or not an individual should be committed. "The mere fact that a
judge must sign a hospitalization order or make a perfunctory examination of
the hospitalization papers has not been sufficient to classify the procedure as
judicial." LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 23.
24 Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76 (1935); Ex parte
Scudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279 (1908); In re Bryant, 214 La. 574, 38
So. 2d 245 (1948) ; Dowdell, Petitioner, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897) ;
accord, In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, 173 N.E.2d 797 (1961).
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for filing a writ of habeas corpus that will test the question of sanity.25
The minority requires notice and right to a hearing.26 Most of the
minority decisions are distinguishable on the grounds that adequate
review procedures were not available.27 It should be noted that in
all the cited cases the question before the court was whether or not
notice and the right to a hearing is required prior to indeterminate
commitment without benefit of a prior observation period or prior
hearing, both of which were present in Wilson.
There has been no prior case law in this jurisdiction concerning
this particular point except In re Boyette 8 There the court held
unconstitutional a statute permitting a judge to commit a person to a
mental hospital after acquittal from a homicide case on the grounds
of insanity. The statute in question provided no means of release
except by act of the General Assembly. The decision was based on
the propositions that the statute provided for no hearing before
commitment, and that after commitment there were no provisions
for judicial review.
Much of the Boyette decision was based upon the latter proposition.29 It is important to note that at the time of this decision the
writ of habeas corpus had not been enlarged 0 and that a person so
" Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Paul v. Longino, 197
Ga. 110, 28 S.E.2d 286 (1943); Hiatt v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d
432 (1949); People v. Terrance, 11 N.Y.2d 362, 229 N.Y.S.2d 737, 183
N.E.2d 752 (1962); Ex parte Dagley, 35 Okla. 180, 128 Pac. 699 (1912);
In re Crosswell, 28 R.I. 137, 66 Ati. 55 (1907); McMahon v. Mead, 30 S.D.
515, 139 N.W.122 (1912).
" it re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901) ; In re Wellman, 3 Kan.
App. 100, 45 Pac. 726 (1896); State ex rel. Blaisdell v. Billings, 55 Minn.
467, 57 N.W. 794 (1893) ; State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269
S.W.2d 72 (1954). Barry v. Hill, 98 F.2d 222 (D.D.C. 1938) has been

frequently cited supporting the minority rule but is distinguishable on the
grounds that a commitment statute was not involved.
" Ross, supra note 2, at 977. The only case that is not clearly distinguishable is State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, supra note 26. An anomaly of the
minority rule is that in some instances the mentally ill person is not required
to be actually present at the hearing. In re Wellman, supra note 26. In
line with this reasoning are cases upholding the valadity of substitute notice.
See, e.g., Okerberg v. People, 119 Colo. 529, 205 P.2d 224 (1949) (notice to
guardian ad litem) ; In re Mast, 217 Ind. 28, 25 N.E.2d 1003 (1940) (notice
to attorney). Contra, Hunt v. Searcy, 167 Mo. 158, 67 S.W. 206 (1902).
For states that have statutory provisions utilizing substitute notice see LINDMAN & MCINYRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 49-51. As to this possibility in
North Carolina-quaere.
28 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904).
Id. at.423-25, 48 S.E. at 792-93.
80 With an enlarged writ other courts have held this type of statute constitutional. E.g., It re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492 (1912); Ex parte
Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 Pac. 552 (1905).
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committed had no means of placing the question of his sanity before
any judicial authority.3 Thus the court in Wilson was not bound
by precedent.3 2
The court in Wilson by refusing to alleviate strict due process
restraints in the area of commitment has definitely placed North
Carolina in the bare minority. Due process is not so inflexible as
to prevent special procedure for special needs." The Supreme Court
of the United States has stated that "it would be unwise to construe
due process to meaning the strict application of notice and hearing," 4
but instead should be "adapted to the end to be attained."35
What then is the "end to be attained" ? The basic consideration
should be to serve the medical welfare of the sick while still protecting
their rights.3 In failing to take judicial notice of North Carolina's
" Boyette has been cited mainly for the proposition that although a per-

son has been committed via defective procedural due process, and thus en-

titled to discharge, he may temporarily be detained while proper proceedings
are initiated to recommit. E.g., Barry v. Hill, 98 F.2d 222 (D.D.C. 1938).
This procedure has been highly recommended. 1961 Hearings 334. It is interesting to note that this procedure was not followed in Wilson although

there had been ample evidence for a finding that the petitioner was dangerous

to herself of others. 257 N.C. at 595, 126 S.E.2d at 490.
" See also Petition of Doyle, 16 R.I. 537, 18 Atl. 159 (1889) in which a
statute was held unconstitutional that did not permit a hearing prior to commitment. After this decision the writ of habeas corpus was enlarged, as
North Carolina has done, and the court ruled that this cured the defect of
lack of notice and hearing prior to commitment. In re Crosswell, 28 R.I.
137, 66 Ad. 55 (1907). The Missouri court, holding in State ex rel. Fuller
v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954) that commitment by certification of two physicians violated due process even though provisions for
appeal and an enlarged writ were available seems to have been based on precedent. For severe criticisms of this case see 68 H~Av. L. REv. 549 (1955)
and 31 N.D.L. REv. 94 (1955).
" As previously noted the majority of courts that have passed on the question of due process requirements in the commitment field have relaxed the
need for notice and hearing. Cases cited notes 24-25 supra. Some authority
for flexible due process is found under the doctrine of parens patriae,in that
the legislature, as parens patriae may, to some extent, make provisions for
the care of those who are unable to care for themselves, as in cases of insane
persons and neglected children. E.g., Hammon v. Hill, 228 Fed. 999 (W.D.
Pa. 1915). For a criticism of this doctrine see Whitmore, supra note 4, at
522 n.18.
"' Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 427-28 (1953). See also Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
" Hager v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884).
e Thus the direction is towards liberalized commitment procedures. See
generally GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT, COM1%MITMENT PROCEDURES (No. 4, 1948); Kadish, A Case Study in the Significance
of ProceduralDue Process-Institutionalizingthe Mentally IU1,9 WESTERN
POLITICAL Q. 93 (1956); Slovenko & Super, The Mentally Disabled, the
Law, and the Report to the American Bar Foundation,47 VA. L. REv. 1366
(1961); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 TEXAS
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constantly improving mental health facilities8 7 and to couple this with
the realistic appeal procedure provided for by an enlarged writ, the
court completely ignored the patient's medical rights. The fact that
notice and a hearing may evolve into a painful traumatic experience
for a mentally ill individual is now fully appreciated."8 Notice to a
paranoid may cause him to flee, while notice to a depressive may
cause suicide.3 9 North Carolina, as a result of Wilson now requires
notice to be given not once, but twice. No other state so holds.
Has the court, by requiring application of strict due process,
really given a person more protection from being "railroaded" ?
Many states employ the same procedure for indeterminate commitment that North Carolina utilizes for observational purposes.4" In
this state the observation period is utilized to further insure that a
sane person is not being deprived of his liberty. Only after the
hospital authorities have had a chance to observe the individual's behavior and have certified to the clerk that he is mentally ill is a
patient indeterminately committed. It is questionable that a second
notice and hearing at the end of the observation period would serve
any useful purpose. The only new evidence likely to be introduced
is the psychiatrists' testimony concerning the patient's behavior while
in the institution. 42 This testimony will be exactly the same as is
L. REV. 307 (1946) ; Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations
in Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947).
" North Carolina is ranked twenty-fourth as to adequacy of physicians in
public mental hospitals. 1961 Hearings 283. The state also has one of the
highest percentages of first patient releases. Over eighty per cent of first
admission patients are released within ninety days. Id. at 176. For a complete survey of the present status of North Carolina mental hospitals see
STATISTICAL AND RESEARCH DIVISIONS OF N. C. HOSPITALS BOARDS OF CONTROL, TRENDS IN HOSPITALIZATION FOR MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
" See, e.g., GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW

(1952);

295

GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT, COMMITMENT PROCEDURES, op. cit. supra note 36; Ross, supra note 2, at 966.
'

1961 Hearings81.

See generally Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L.
274, 293-97 (1953). Although the popular fears of "star chambers"
and "lettres de cachet" are still prevalent, "railroading" as such, is almost
nonexistent. Dr. Eugene Hargrove, Commissioner of Mental Health, has
stated that in the seventeen years he has been associated with mental institutions he has not known of one single case. 1961 Hearings 176. This is also
true in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Slovenko & Super, supra note 36, at
1368. For a good example of a "railroading" case see Shields v. Shields, 26
F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
"' See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44-106; Ross, supra
note 2, at 1008-16. Other states have provisions for observational commitment before indeterminate commitment, but the observation period is initiated
without notice and hearing.
,2 For the proponents of a second hearing it should be noted that the
REV.
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now forwarded to the clerk requesting indeterminate commitment.
If a sane person is by some chance being "railroaded" there is little
doubt that he would be released by the hospital or would have applied
for a writ under the doctrine of In re Harris43 by or before the time
that the observation period is terminated.
The effect of this decision is twofold: (1) A more expensive
court procedure is now required to commit, and (2) a definite hindrance has been introduced to the effective care and treatment of
patients through the adverse effect of a second notice and possible
second hearing.,
The possibilities of what course of action the next General Assembly will take in light of this decision are innumerable. One possibility
already under consideration is to do away altogether with the observation period and have one hearing to decide indeterminate commitment.4" Thus the final result of a decision meant to protect the constitutional rights of the mentally ill may well cause them to:lose one
safeguard not afforded in any other state--an observation period
after hearing before final commitment.
GEORGE C. CocHAN
Real Property-Restrictive Covenants-Effect of Change of Conditions on Enforcement.
It is well established that under appropriate circumstances equity
will invalidate privately imposed restrictive covenants limiting the
use of land in unified subdivisions.' In general this is deemed approsecond hearing will be conducted by the same clerk that made the original
commitment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-46.1 (Supp. 1961). The idea of a
"last ditch stand" with a battery of lawyers cross-examining the hospital
psychiatrists in order to secure the patient's release is inconceivable. If the
clerk had enough evidence to commit for the observation period it is extremely doubtful that his decision will change, for the psychiatric testimony
is in addition to the other positive evidence previously received and will serve
to bear out what the clerk had already decided-that the person is mentally
ill.
"241 N.C. 179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954). It should be noted that there is
dictum in the principle case indicating that the court did not fully consider
the enlarged writ and its implications. 257 N.C. at 597, 126 S.E.2d at 492.
"Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 8, 1962. p. 1B, col. 6.
'This can result from two types of actions: affirmative relief granted to
parties seeking to have the restrictions lifted, or refusal of the court to issue
an injunction preventing violation of the restrictions. Either method being
equitable relief, may or may not also preclude a remedy at law. Some courts
hold the decree in equity extinguishes the covenant entirely, while others
maintain that mere unenforceability in equity does not preclude an action at
law for damages for breach of covenant. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 9.39, at 444-45 (Casner ed. 1952); 13 N.C.L. Rnv. 518 (1935).

